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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 10-2342 
 ___________ 
 
 BRENTON LEE, 
            Appellant 
 
  v. 
 
NJ TRANSIT; 
AMALGAMATED TRANSIT UNION LOCAL 825 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Appeal from the United States District Court 
 for the District of New Jersey 
 (D.C. Civil Action No. 08-cv-05972) 
 District Judge:  Honorable Dennis M. Cavanaugh 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
March 15, 2011 
 
 Before:  SCIRICA, SMITH and VANASKIE, Circuit Judges 
 
 (Opinion filed:  March 17, 2011 ) 
 
 ___________ 
 
 OPINION 
 ___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Brenton Lee appeals the District Court’s order granting Appellees’ motions for 
summary judgment.  For the reasons below, we will affirm. 
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 The procedural history of this case and the details of Lee’s claims are well known 
to the parties, set forth in the District Court’s thorough opinion, and need not be 
discussed at length.  Briefly, Lee filed a complaint in which he alleged that New Jersey 
Transit terminated him on the basis of his national origin.  He also claimed in his 
pleadings that the Union arbitrarily refused to take his case to arbitration and withdrew an 
offer of reinstatement.  After the District Court granted Appellees’ motions for summary 
judgment, Lee filed a notice of appeal. 
 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise plenary review over the 
District Court’s order granting Appellees’ motion for summary judgment.  Gallo v. City 
of Philadelphia, 161 F.3d 217, 221 (3d Cir. 1998).  A grant of summary judgment will be 
affirmed if our review reveals that “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and 
that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 
56(c)(2009) (amended Dec. 1, 2010).  We review the facts in a light most favorable to the 
party against whom summary judgment was entered.  See Coolspring Stone Supply, Inc. 
v. American States Life Ins. Co., 10 F.3d 144, 146 (3d Cir. 1993). 
 On appeal, Lee disputes the facts surrounding the accident which led to his 
termination.  However, the issue is not whether Lee left the scene of an accident; the 
question is whether there are disputed material facts with respect to whether Appellee 
New Jersey Transit’s reasons for terminating Lee were discriminatory.  The only 
evidence Lee provides to support his claim of discrimination is his allegation that another 
employee referred to Lee’s “black ass.”  As noted by the District Court, Lee agreed at his 
deposition that his termination had nothing to do with his nationality and more to do with 
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his personality.  We agree with the District Court that Lee has not made a prima facie 
claim of discrimination on the basis of national origin.  Moreover, from the evidence in 
the record, it is abundantly clear that an accident occurred and that Lee left the scene.  
This supports NJ Transit’s assertion that Lee was terminated for leaving the scene of an 
accident. 
 Lee contends that the Union’s acts of withdrawing an offer of reinstatement and 
declining to file a grievance with respect to his termination were arbitrary.  The Union 
argues that Lee’s claim of a violation of the duty of fair representation was untimely 
because it was not filed within six months of the alleged violation.  See DelCostello v. 
Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151 (1983).  Lee does not dispute that his claim was 
subject to a six-month statute of limitations.  Rather, he argues that there are material 
issues of fact regarding when it became clear that further union appeals were futile.  
However, he points to no facts which would support a finding that the statute of 
limitations did not begin to run until sometime after June 2008, six months before he filed 
his complaint in December 2008.
1
  Moreover, even if the claim were timely, Lee has not 
shown that any of the Union’s actions regarding his case were arbitrary, discriminatory or 
done in bad faith. 
                                                 
1
  In July 2007, Lee was informed that the Union had decided not to arbitrate his 
case.  App. at 59a.  At his deposition, Lee stated that he lost faith in the Union 
when they denied arbitration for his case.  App. at 124a.  Thus, it appears that after 
the denial of arbitration, over a year before he filed his complaint, he believed that 
further union appeals were futile. 
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 For the above reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment.2 
 
                                                 
2
  Lee argues that his due process rights were violated by the District Court’s 
order.  He contends that he has a property interest in his reputation and his 
profession.  However, Lee was given notice of the appellees’ motions for 
summary judgment and an opportunity to respond.  Thus, there was no violation of 
due process. 
